From Championship to Courtroom: Municipal Crowd-Management Policies Tested After Denver NBA Finals Celebration
(Editor’s Note: From the pages of Sports Litigation Alert)
By William H. Gray, Esq. – Senior Associate Attorney at Segal McCambridge Singer & Mahoney Ltd.
Championship victories frequently result in spontaneous public gatherings, presenting significant crowd-management and security challenges for municipalities, venue operators, and law enforcement agencies alike. As cities increasingly host watch parties, victory parades, and post-event street celebrations tied to major sporting events, the potential for civil liability arising from crowd-control tactics has become an underexamined risk within the sports industry. A recent federal decision arising out of the Denver Nuggets’ 2023 NBA Championship celebration highlights this growing exposure, as the court allowed a §1983 municipal liability claim to proceed against the City and County of Denver based upon allegations that inadequate police training in crowd management and use-of-force tactics contributed to injuries sustained during post-game festivities. See Smith v. City & County of Denver, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 169447 [D Colo Aug. 29, 2025, Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-01636-SKC-CYC]).
The litigation arises out of events that occurred in downtown Denver on June 12, 2023, following the Denver Nuggets’ first NBA Championship victory. In the immediate aftermath of the game, large crowds gathered throughout downtown Denver to celebrate the historic win, including outside of Hayter’s & Co., a local sports bar, where Elijah Smith and several friends had assembled. During the course of the public celebration, an altercation broke out between one of Smith’s companions and another individual in the crowd, prompting Smith to intervene.
At that time, Adam Glasby, an off-duty Denver Police Department officer who was working as a bouncer for Hayter’s & Co., observed the incident and approached Smith from behind. According to the allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint, Glasby, who was wearing his official Denver Police Department uniform, utility belt, body-worn camera, and carrying his department-issued service weapon, physically restrained Smith and lifted him into the air before forcefully slamming him headfirst onto the pavement, rendering Smith. Smith was later transported to a local hospital, where he was diagnosed with a brain bleed and nerve damage to his left shoulder.
Thereafter, Smith commenced an action against the City and County of Denver (hereinafter collectively “Denver”), Officer Glasby, and Hayter’s & Co., asserting against Denver a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Smith’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure through the use of excessive force. Smith alleges that, notwithstanding Glasby’s off-duty status at the time of the incident, his conduct was attributable to the municipality due to Denver’s alleged failure to adequately train its officers in appropriate crowd-management and use-of-force tactics.
In response, Denver filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff failed to assert a claim to which relief may be granted as municipalities may not be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
Applicable Standard
As a general rule, Denver’s reliance on the doctrine of respondeat superior is founded as Plaintiff contends that Glasby was a Denver Police Officer, a trained municipal employee, at the time of the incident. However, a narrowly defined exception to this rule exists – the Monell Standard. Under Monell, a municipality can be found liable only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must show that: (1) a municipal employee committed a constitutional violation and (2) a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the violation. See Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 419 (10th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a municipal policy or custom is defined as: (1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; (3) the decisions of employees with final policymaking authority; (4) the ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions — and the basis for them — of subordinates to whom authority was delegated subject to these policymakers’ review and approval; or (5) the failure to adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused. See Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010)
Argument
In asserting his claim, Plaintiff focused his argument on two of the five accepted policies/customs: (1) an alleged widespread custom and (2) failure to properly train. However, the Court noted that Plaintiff need only plead plausible facts regarding one of the above-mentioned policies or customs under Monell to survive Denver’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. As such, the Court focused its analysis on Denver’s alleged failure to properly train its police officers in crowd control and hands-on contact. It has been well established that the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for liability to attach to a municipality where the failure “amounts to a deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” See Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1318 (10th Cir. 2002). In this regard, deliberate indifference is established only when a city has actual or constructive notice that its actions or omissions are substantially likely to result in constitutional violations, and it deliberately chooses to disregard that risk of harm. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1989). “In most instances, notice can be established by proving the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct.” See Carr v. Castle, 337 F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 2003).
Denver argued that the Amended Complaint failed to allege a pattern of conduct sufficient to support municipal liability under Monell. Specifically, Denver characterized the incident as a “bar fight,” contending that the prior excessive-force allegations cited by Plaintiff involved large-scale protest settings and were therefore too attenuated to establish notice of training deficiencies relevant to this incident. Denver maintained that the Complaint relied on mere speculation that an alleged constitutional violation by an officer necessarily implies inadequate municipal training. It further notes that the Amended Complaint failed to identify any specific training deficiency causally linked to Smith’s injuries.
Plaintiff countered that Denver’s characterization of the event as a “bar fight” ignored the broader context of the circumstances where a championship celebration spilled onto public streets. Such an event is akin to a large-scale protest or gathering, requiring crowd-management tactics. To support deliberate indifference, Plaintiff identified more than forty-five prior incidents involving alleged excessive force in a crowd-control setting, as well as cited prior statements by Denver Police Department personnel following the 2020 George Floyd protests acknowledging shortcomings in use-of-force and crowd-management training. According to the Amended Complaint, those admissions placed Denver on notice of training deficiencies in satisfaction of Monell.
Upon review, the Court rejected Denver’s attempt to reclassify the incident as a “bar fight” and instead evaluated the allegations as arising during a large gathering or protest. Giving weight to the Department’s prior public acknowledgments regarding training deficiencies, the Court concluded that the proximity of the 2020 protests to the 2023 incident supported a reasonable inference that Denver was on notice of potential deficiencies in crowd-management training yet failed to take corrective action. That alleged inaction constituted deliberate indifference under Monell. Accepting the pleaded facts as true, including that the officer was in full police uniform, armed with his service weapon, and reported the incident as occurring while acting as a Denver Police officer, the Court held that Plaintiff plausibly alleged that Denver’s failure to train was the moving force behind the injuries sustained during the championship celebration.
Lasting impact
The ruling highlights increased municipal exposure stemming from crowd-control measures executed during sports-related public gatherings. As championship celebrations and post-game assemblies increasingly move into public spaces, municipalities and law enforcement agencies face greater scrutiny of training protocols governing use-of-force and crowd-management tactics. The decision recognizes that a history of crowd-management issues and a municipalities’ failure to take any corrective action, may constitute sufficient notice to support a failure-to-train claim under Monell. Therefore, as established in Smith, efficient crowd management training is critical, not only for public safety, but to mitigate civil liability for municipalities and venues alike.